The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.



RESTRUCTURING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID W. REANEY United States Army

19960529 014

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for public release.

Distribution is unlimited

USAWC CLASS OF 1996



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

RESTRUCTURING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID W. REANEY UNITED STATES ARMY

COLONEL WILLIAM LARSON

PROJECT ADVISOR

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: David W. Reaney (LTC), USA

TITLE: Restructuring the Intelligence Community for the

21st Century

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 10 April 1996 PAGES: 31 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In the post cold war era changes are taking place in the intelligence community and in the organizations it is tasked to support. Discussions about the appropriate structure and missions of the intelligence community are underway internally, in Congress, and in the Administration. Reviewing current structures can identify where use of information age technology can result in improved operations. Development of a community wide prioritization process that focuses efforts and identifies redundant operations will ensure the best use of capabilities. Focusing the intelligence community on the needs of its most important customers will ensure appropriate prioritization in available assets.

In 1992, Senator David Boren called for the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence. A Director of National Intelligence leading the community is a good answer. A single all source analysis element combined with a customer support element could use information age technology to provide better, faster support with fewer personnel at supported organizations. Specialized intelligence production agencies tasked by a single collection manager would eliminate redundant effort. A single community support organization would streamline personnel, security, communications, training and logistics functions. The resulting intelligence community provide better support with fewer people and lower costs.

ILLUSTRATION

Future Intelligence Community Organization....page 23

Introduction

In the post cold war era changes are taking place in the intelligence community and in the organizations it is tasked to support. This paper will review current structures and identify areas where adjusting to modern capabilities can result in improved operations. It will also take a brief look at how the intelligence community should be focused to ensure appropriate priority is placed in using the limited assets available. Finally the report will identify a proposed reorganization of the community to take full advantage of emerging capabilities.

Call for Reorganization

In February 1992 Senator David Boren introduced a bill calling for the reorganization of the intelligence community. While Senator Boren would have liked his bill to have become law he did not expect that to happen. What he did expect was for the bill to open a line of discussion. He felt there was a need for change in the intelligence community as a result of the end of the cold war and corresponding major efforts to reduce government spending. Senator Boren proposed the creation of "a new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to coordinate US intelligence activities, to serve as the President's principal intelligence advisor, and to provide operational supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency." He also proposed that the DNI would serve as a nonvoting participant of the National Security Council. Senator Boren's bill along with similar legislation submitted by Congressman McCurdy was the start of a long process of assessing the intelligence community and identifying ways to adjust its

size and missions to meet post-cold war requirements.2

In the four years following introduction of Senator Boren's bill the intelligence sub-committees of the House and Senate as well as the Administration have conducted intense discussions on how to save money and redefine the mission of the intelligence community. In 1994 Congress mandated in public law 103-359 a requirement for the administration to appoint a commission to review the roles and capabilities of the intelligence community no later than February 1995. The mandate called for the commission to report its findings by March 1996. Former Defense Secretary Les Aspin was selected to lead the commission and did so until his death and replacement by another former Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, in June 1995.

The commission was tasked to review a number of questions concerning the intelligence community under four topic areas. This paper focuses on two of the topic areas. First, "the intelligence needs and priorities of the U.S. Government in the post-cold war world." This involves reviewing requirements based on the collapse of the Soviet Union, expansion of U.S. military involvement in response to crises world-wide, counter proliferation and counter narcotics operations as well as the emphasis on economic aspects of national strategy. The second topic area involves determining if "the existing organizational arrangement within the intelligence community provides the most effective and efficient framework for satisfying needs." This involves reviewing the authority of the DCI to look for cost

savings through new ways of doing business like centralizing common functions, using new technologies and adapting private sector business practices. It Also includes looking for efficiencies in analysis and production through prioritization as well as reviewing dissemination to, and relations with, consumers to see if a separate organizational element could improve operations.

Mr. Aspin identified the complexity of the challenge facing his committee and the community when he described the increasing mission involvement in nontraditional targets at the same time cost and personnel reductions are underway. He even offered the idea that the post cold-war structure might require starting with a clean slate, much like his bottom up review of the Defense Department posing the question of "what would (the) organization look like once a new set of targets is found?"6 A combination of issues were probably on Mr. Aspin's mind when he posed his question. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union has vastly reduced the need to seek out information from closed societies. Second, innovations being made available as a result of the information age will make amassing and using information easier. One fact stands clear. The status quo is not adequate and must change. Congress wants that change now. There must be validation that work is being done with the smallest number of people required to complete tasks and that costs are kept to a minimum. Understanding customer needs and the technology of the information age can help in this change.

Customer

An area of serious concern in attempting to apply limited assets to a vast range of requirements is clear identification of priorities. Prioritization of work and definition of what missions the intelligence community should accomplish is best done by focusing on the customer. The Director of Central Intelligence, Dr. John Deutch, clearly identified his two prime customers in speaking to the National Defense University last June. He stated that, "The primary mission of the intelligence community is to assure that the President and the other leaders of the nation have the best information available before making decisions..."7 In discussing the need for intelligence to support policy formulation by the President as well as the Secretary of State and Defense, Dr. Deutch also described the objectives he sees for intelligence and its connections with Defense. He sighted support to military operations as critical, "The intelligence community must be clearly focused on the needs of the war-fighter and an ability to support military operations."8 This requires timely information and unassailable accuracy. Dr. Deutch went on to highlight the point that there is a very different set of threats today that requires sophisticated intelligence to support policy response world-wide. He identified four key threats in a post-Cold War world. First, the possibility of a major regional conflict as has occurred in Iraq and could occur there and elsewhere, such as Korea. Second, the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery

methods. Third, the need to deal with lessor regional conflicts such as Haiti. Fourth, the need to watch instability in the former Soviet Union. 9

The entire intelligence system, as indicated by Dr. Deutch, must be focused on supporting the Nation's senior leaders and military commanders. Today's system of estimates and summaries for communicating non-time sensitive intelligence information to leaders meets day-to-day requirements. However, handling intelligence in a rapidly developing crisis and providing it to national leaders as well as military commanders requires rapid analysis and a complex, timely world-wide distribution system.

Information Age

Information age development is providing the ability to collect, process and disseminate information at terrific speeds. In the commercial sector this has led to the ATM machine, voice mail, electronic pager, digital telephone, facsimile machine and countless other innovations. The government has also changed significantly as a result of these changes with electronic tax filing, machine read mail distribution and countless office automation improvements. Organizations such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have transitioned their analysts from a paper and file cabinet dominated environment to one that is nearly paperless. Analysts can now review information pulled from databases, develop appropriate reports, transmit the reports and file their work all on a single computer screen. They can also use the computer to

send informal messages to other analysts and receive feedback. It is easy to demonstrate that such adaption to information age capabilities has gone extremely well in the U.S. intelligence system. However, adjustment of the work force to take full advantage of information age technology is another matter.

One of the great strengths of information age technology is the ability to provide rapid information and guidance. In the commercial sector this has led to a flattening of management structures within organizations, significantly reducing the number of mid-level managers required and the cost they incurred on the organization. In government the adjustment from industrial age management structures to flatter structures that use information age capabilities remains to take place. Former Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, described this need stating that, "The inflexible machines and bureaucratic processes of the industrial age justified their expense through mass, but the speed of an information age corporation will turn this industrial world inside out. Information age corporations beat their competition by compressing time, expanding market share, and increasing productivity. They also try to eliminate the "assembly line mentality" while, simultaneously, trimming their bureaucracies. These are keys to success in the information age."10 General Sullivan indicated that "the capital of the information age is the organizational capacity achieved by less hierarchial "learning organizations." The ideas, skills, and abilities of well educated workers and leaders are primary

economic assets; part of the capital of the information age."11 General Sullivan went on to talk about the military's use of technology in providing shared situational awareness on the battlefield. This transition of military command and control is well underway in the form of Command, Control Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) initiatives.¹²

C4I

To meet the information needs of the military commander the intelligence community must be able to communicate with military forces quickly and efficiently. The Department of Defense utilizes the C4I system to communicate both horizontally and vertically to all the forces. Today this system is characterized as having hundreds of different systems dedicated to a particular task with individually designed software and hardware. The communications systems within the intelligence community also fit this characterization. This is a costly, inefficient way of communicating which will not meet time requirements or budgetary constraints of the 21st century. To correct the situation the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD, C3I) has established a long range goal of "100 percent interoperability: the creation of a global network of information databases and fusion centers, accessible to commanders and armed forces anywhere and at anytime."13

The 21st Century system is envisioned as one allowing a commander, regardless of echelon, to plug in and pull all

available information concerning his operational area. It is being designed to allow a single query search of all appropriate databases -- logistical, medical, operational or intelligence related -- that provides a composite of available information. This system has the potential of providing the commander with unprecedented access to intelligence information. However, to make the intelligence available, connectivity provided by C4I in the war fighting community will have to be compatible with intelligence reporting procedures and methods. Only then will the rapidly useable, fused information being sought be accessible. This requires unprecedented levels of cooperation among the intelligence agencies as well as a multilevel security capability that essentially merges today's MILNET, DSNET1, DSNET2 and DSNET3 systems and connects the resulting network to tactical networks. It will also require that intelligence agencies connect their individual databases and communications systems to each other and all echelons of the Department of Defense. Only by joining the C4I system will intelligence agencies meet Dr. Deutch's requirement of providing the intelligence needed to the military commander. 14

Changes

Dr. Deutch identified his vision of required change using these words. "First, we have to be sure that we develop our techniques to support the customer-to support the military user, to worry about distribution and to worry about serving the military commander rather than develop matters that are mostly of

interest to ourselves. Secondly, we have to ensure that there is integration of information from all sources-not from individual technical means. Thirdly, we have to assure that there is interoperability of information systems, so that there is rapid communication between commanders, analysts and the civilian National Command Authority." The commission finding on lack of centralized control and Dr. Deutch's vision for supporting customers provides the framework to review and recommend changes in the current production, distribution and structure of the intelligence community.

Production

Today thousands of analysts are assigned to the intelligence agencies reviewing and producing reports on a wide range of collected information. Collection is based on requirements submitted by customers. The list of customers includes the military forces, the various government departments (State, Treasury, etc.) and other intelligence agencies. Requirements are passed through a validation process and, once validated, are placed on a requirements list (i.e. the National SIGINT Requirement List (NSRL)). If collectable with existing capabilities the requirement may be satisfied fairly quickly. If research and development is required it can take years to develop a capability to collect the information.

Analysts reside in elements organized by activity type or region and spend their time reviewing material and producing reports based on validated requirements. Typically, raw

intelligence is compiled in a database over a period of time, usually 24 hours. The analyst pulls information from the database for study and fusion with other information. He then combines database information (usually single source such as Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)) and produces a report about the activity that occurred. These finished products, the mainstay of the big intelligence agencies, provide continuity on a subject but generally arrive well after an activity has occurred. Copies of the report go to analysts at other agencies who review it in light of their information. When analysts find similarity with their own single discipline source they merge the information and produce fused reports of the activity. The fused reports build on continuity but are even older than the first by the time they reach consumers. In a rapidly changing situation this routine reporting does not reach consumers in time to influence decisions. The intelligence agencies recognize this method is not fast enough in a crisis and have developed special elements focused on timely support to military operations.

The Support to Military Operations (SMO) elements within intelligence agencies generally fall outside the traditional management structure which controls day-to-day collection and analysis. The SMO element usually consists of members of various disciplines to ensure information is accurate and processed quickly. These elements are generally manned 24 hours a day with supervisors adjusting collection requirements based on customer

needs while analysts constantly search databases and provide timely information relating to the crisis.

Survey results from NSA's 1995 Worldwide Cryptologic Military Support Symposium indicate the SMO system works well. In questioning attendees from all major military commands, NSA military support earned a "71% good-to-excellent rating."16 However, the symposium also highlighted issues concerning SMO in relation to the rest of the NSA structure and mission. Personnel assigned to SMO sections are often seen as performing outside their "primary" field and often not promoted at the rate of their peers in production sections. Each crisis is treated as an adhoc, reactive situation by production sections resulting in one-time arrangements for access to skilled personnel and databases. Because people and budget dollars are involved "turf" battles spring up as a crisis is extended over time. The impression left on many consumers was that SMO was seen as a detractor by production elements with rapid adjustments in tasking requests by the customer disrupting existing requirements and therefore production. While NSA received a good rating in military support, the impression is that it was "in spite of" the rest of their production rather than as a management goal built into the entire organization as Dr. Deutch might articulate. 17

Compounding the issue of providing support to the military are budget cutbacks. All of the intelligence agencies are being forced to reduce their work force. Changes have tended to involve curtailment of new projects and reductions in the numbers of

people working in an office, resulting in less time spent on existing intelligence activities. However, most analysts continue to build information and produce reports as they always have-in depth analysis each day on an area of concentration to build total knowledge on a subject. While this philosophy falls within the comfort zone of supervisors and analysts, it fails to meet future information needs and capabilities. The same technology and philosophy used in SMO to provide rapid reporting can be used in the entire organization to downsize yet maintain customer support.

Correcting the current requirement satisfaction process is the most important change. Today's process has established many more potential areas of focus than the system can support. Established collection systems and reporting processes are the result of priorities developed during the cold war and are optimized for production against cold war requirements. The decline in budgets has created the need to use every available system effectively and to be able to quantify usage. Since these systems produce best against particular types of targets, collection managers satisfy the requirements best collected by the systems to keep their production statistics high. All to often this results in collection of what is collectable rather than what is important. The machines and people are producing but not the product the customer wants. The solution is too change focus from volume production-a typical industrial age focus-to production focused on satisfying the highest priority.

Transition from large, bulky organizations focused on production to flatter organizational structures able to adjust to new priorities is required. Dr. Deutch established the community's priority customers and areas of concern. The next step is to shift to a priority based system defining success as priority satisfaction rather than volume. In discussing the change Richard Haver, Executive Director of Intelligence Community Affairs, felt that, "This change will redefine the professional skills and work routines for as much as 60 percent of the intelligence community."18 The reality of post cold war priorities is that they change rapidly and appear in unexpected locations. Countless billions spent on cold war intelligence systems could not provide adequate information to forces in places like Greneda or Rawanda. Yet, rescue, humanitarian and peace keeping operations are the military's most likely future missions. Building on the success of the SMO process, intelligence agencies must now use technology and a team approach to tackle priority missions. 19

NSA has a fledgling effort towards this concept called SIGINT Research and Target Development (SRTD). An SRTD team is tasked to study a potential threat in great detail and develop a database on the country or entity (i.e., a potential terrorist organization). The team then moves to another entity and repeats the process. The team is composed of electronic, traffic, and cryptographic analysts working together on three year assignments. This concept results in short term, intense

collection and analysis on a targeted entity to establish a baseline for future efforts. This method provides a SMO start point should a crisis occur while identifying what information needs can be met using available technology and systems. Capability shortfalls can be fed into overall requirements databases used in developing new collection processes. The SRTD team reduces the need for a work force focused full time on each potential threat, critical during downsizing, while maintaining awareness on the threat. When a crisis occurs the responsible SRTD team forms the core response cell to which additional analysts are added. Ten analysts assigned to medium priority threats in this manner can replace hundreds of workers with minimal increase in the risk of being unprepared for a crisis. Analysts assigned to SRTD teams also develop much more flexible skills than their counterparts in the existing structure. The number of analysts, and staff, associated with specific threats could be reduced (i.e. keep only those linked by language capability) in an SRTD type organization. Former specialized analysts could be trained to work on all-source teams putting a microscope on current priority threats and producing results.

Used in an all source production environment the SRTD concept would use a smaller corps of analysts to provide unprecedented levels of support to military commanders. Today an equivalent level of support requires the dispatch of a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) to a supported command. The NIST team provides experts from each agency and discipline on a

temporary basis during crisis. However, because the team is a temporary arrangement personnel must develop target knowledge and individual working relationships before becoming fully effective. Additionally, each team member must maintain continuous contact with his parent agency to obtain information. This requires an extensive communication support structure. The NIST team is almost the right answer. The quickest crisis support would come from a permanent team with all source capabilities organized on the SRTD model. Such a team, provided state of the art connectivity to databases and supported commands is the best solution to customer support.

Distribution

The move from assembly line production to a system characterized by large volumes of stored information awaiting requests will cause a shift in providing intelligence to the customer. The future of intelligence dissemination rests on the evolution of Intelink, a secure, internet-like system which is currently in its nascent stages. Intelink, as the strategic direction for intelligence dissemination, was jointly mandated in August 1994 by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Mr. Woolsey and, then, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Deutch. By jointly agreeing to Intelink as the intelligence distribution system, they tied Intelink and its supporting technologies to the emerging C4I architecture.²⁰

The C4I architecture reflects requirements for a true, realtime picture of the battlespace as well as the capability to receive necessary information any time, any place. The Defense Department's Global Command and Control System (GCCS) will be the overarching architecture with which military operations will be planned, executed, and managed. GCCS along with Intelink will be C4I for the 21st Century.²¹

Current intelligence dissemination based on a set of disparate systems, each "owned and operated" by its respective agency must shift to Intelink to meet required support standards. Today most systems are "push" in nature requiring the potential customer to ask himself three questions before requesting intelligence: What do I want to know? Whom do I ask? How will I get it? This system requires detailed knowledge on the part of the individual requesting the information and is extremely inefficient. If the requester believes the information is resident in more than one place, he needs to submit his request to each intelligence discipline, provided of course, he has the connectivity to receive the information.

In the future, the requestor will ask himself only one question: What do I want to know? Intelink, with powerful search tools (software), will integrate currently independent databases allowing the customer too "pull" information from all disciplines and receive exactly what he needs. He will also be able to stipulate periodic update times allowing information to assemble until needed and then self-transmit in a single update. During movement to the operational area, for example, previously pulled intelligence is updated automatically, awaiting unit arrival in

the area of operations. Upon arrival the commander requests the update and it is immediately provided. Throughout the process time-sensitive intelligence related to force survival and command stipulated emergencies would be "pushed" automatically. The commander's ability to query Intelink any time and receive updates whenever he desires will provide unparalleled access to intelligence. 22

Although the Intelink dissemination architecture of the 21st Century will be internet-like, there will be significant differences. The Internet, for example, is loosely managed with no real "net control." Intelink, will require close management as well as standardized interfaces and protocols. Perhaps the most substantial difference will be Intelink's ability to disseminate all types of intelligence at all classification levels; clearly, multi-level security will be critical to Intelink's future. Further, it's audit trail capability will allow managers to analyze customer demand for various information sets, thus identifying unwanted information and redundancies for use in collection and analysis decisions.²³

The future dissemination architecture will rely on broadcast technologies. Currently Intelink uses the same "pipe" to send and receive information. In the future, a customer's "pull" request may be transmitted on a narrow pipe while the response is provided via a broadcast-much like selection of satellite broadcast movies to the home is now done via a telephone connection and the movie beamed down to the receive antenna. Use

of digital addressing techniques will allow filtering of broadcast information disseminating only requested information to individual customers.

The benefits of such an intelligence dissemination system will be enormous. It will demystify the intelligence "monster" by allowing all intelligence disciplines to be accessed easily, quickly and simultaneously. In addition, it will make better use of existing and future processing capabilities by processing and transmitting only information customers request.

While the future Intelink's capabilities will be significant, so too are the challenges. Like the internet today, Intelink is stove-piped, the user is required to search each agency database to access information and then compile the individual responses. Today intelligence agencies pull information-usually finished reports-from their databases and place it in Intelink accessible files. These databases, historically protected from outside access, will need to be made accessible on Intelink, with customer access to the information defined merely by his level of access. Each agency must store data in a similar fashion in order for a single search tool to efficiently access all databases. This will result in intelligence dissemination radically different from today. It will be all-source, readily and rapidly accessible, but most of all, it will be tailored by the customer to meet his needs.

Central to understanding the future information dissemination architecture is understanding the future use of

broadcast capabilities. Today's broadcasts (i.e. the Tactical Intelligence Broadcast System (TIBS)) are characterized as continuous streams of data, all-inclusive of a particular data set. All available data meeting any unique requirement is transmitted en masse. Consumers are obliged to set their own filters on the particular receive equipment they use. Without filter settings, every customer will receive every bit of data, regardless of individual need or desire. This is data "push" in its purest form.

The broadcast of the future will be tailored to what customers want. Based on stated requirements, pre-broadcast processors will extract and forward only requested data or data meeting time-sensitive forwarding criteria. Each broadcast transmission will be "tagged" and addressed to the particular user. (This is the "compute, then communicate" concept espoused in "C4I for the Warrior".) Communications processors resident with the user will extract only information addressed to him. Since data is transmitted only when and if it is needed-vice as it is produced-a significant savings in satellite bandwidth will be realized.²⁴

On the Internet today, when the individual PC owner logs onto his Internet service provider, he's using the same pipe to both send and receive data between his PC and the server. It is typically a very small pipe. This can be very inefficient, particularly if the requested information requires a large file transfer.

In the future, Intelink-through GCCS-will receive requests and send the requested information via the most efficient means; a short text file may go back through the "request pipe" while a large imagery file might be added to the "broadcast stream" and sent to the customer. The customer doesn't need to know-nor should he care-how it gets to him.

The development of a viable intelligence communication architecture that fits the C4I system will provide the means for delivering required information to military forces. Coupling this with the transition of intelligence agencies to a prioritized, quick response structure will ensure development and delivery of the appropriate information to meet the needs of the commander. Success depends on the intelligence community developing a level of cooperation well above any seen in the past. Terminology must be virtually identical to ensure communication of ideas and problems are clearly understood. Support must be provided in smaller packages and at a cheaper cost to effectively meet needs while undergoing budget reductions. Working in such an environment clearly calls for thinking "outside the box," much like Les Aspin postulated as he assumed leadership of the commission on roles and capabilities. Change will be the norm for the majority of people involved in the intelligence community. It is therefore not unrealistic to completely change the way the community is organized to ensure it meets tomorrow's requirements.

Reorganization

The viability of the intelligence community demands maintenance of effective intelligence support to consumers while reducing costs and personnel. In order to be meaningful, reorganization of the intelligence community should achieve several key goals:


- a. Maintain/improve support to consumers. Dr. Deutch stated that his most important tasks are to provide intelligence to senior leaders and military commanders. Neither priority can be sacrificed in a reorganization.²⁵
- b. Eliminate unnecessary redundancy. The reorganization process should combine similar functions (e.g. logistics, personnel, security, finance) among existing agencies.²⁶
- c. Establish a single intelligence voice at supported organizations. A single focal point for intelligence community support, with subordinate discipline experts, should replace today's system of senior-level representatives from each agency.
- d. Develop a community-wide requirements prioritization process. Under the assumption that all customer requests are valid, replace the validation system with a prioritization process based on relative priority on the national level. Centralized prioritization will ensure limited assets are devoted to appropriate targets.²⁷
- e. Increase military participation in the intelligence community. Support to military operations is a critical element of the community mission. Military personnel must be integrated

throughout the community articulating the requirements of the military customer while gaining experience in the process.²⁸

Structure

Following Senator Boren's suggestion, a Director of National Intelligence should be created to lead all intelligence activities. The community should be restructured with characteristics more analogous to an Army Division than the present community. The DNI would have a large directorate staff, similar to the division general staff, to plan, manage and equip. Directorate staffs would ensure the community met the Director's objectives with a single representative at customer locations, a single prioritization hub, a single all-source production element and a combined research and development effort. Subordinate agencies, similar to maneuver brigades, would complete independent intelligence collection and processing missions. Like brigades, subordinate agencies would not need large staffs because a common National Intelligence Support Activity (NISA), similar to a division support command, would provide all necessary support based on the Director's priorities. Standardization by the support activity could isolate cost effective solutions to eliminate redundancy. Overlap of individual disciplines would be by exception, with specific DNI approval. Senior military leaders would be distributed throughout the community. Specifically, the Deputy DNI would be a designated military position as would a mix of senior leadership positions in both the directorates and single discipline agencies.

Furture Intelligence Community Organization



Staff Directorates

The Director of National Intelligence would be supported by four major staff directorates:

- a. The Customer Support Directorate would be responsible for all aspects of intelligence community-to-customer interface. It would receive intelligence requirements and place them within a national prioritization list. It would then task the single discipline agencies based on applied prioritization. It would field a permanent National Intelligence Cell staffed with an appropriate balance of discipline experts under a single senior-level representative at each supported command (replacing the crisis-only National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) as well as the large single agency staffs currently in place). The directorate would also be responsible for augmenting these cells to meet needs during crisis.
- b. The all-source production directorate would be responsible for compiling all available single discipline intelligence into a finished product-from daily summaries to long term National Intelligence Estimates. It would also serve as the national interface to individual military service intelligence centers. The directorate would delegate and coordinate production responsibility to ensure efforts of the service intelligence centers (i.e., the National Ground Intelligence Center) were not duplicative.²⁹
 - c. The executive staff would merge the present community

management staff with many of its counterparts at today's agencies. Rather than receiving program inputs from each agency for building the foreign intelligence program budget, this staff would prioritize community needs and build the budget accordingly. Multi-discipline strategic planning would ensure proper community-wide balance based on capability to meet priority requirements. The budget process would change from one often focused on self-preservation of an agency, to one of community-wide effectiveness.

d. The research and development directorate would consolidate all systems development and application. It would apply advanced technology to the prioritized community needs. Partnerships with industry and internal R&D would be stressed. This directorate would be responsible for applications through the fielding stage when it would hand off operational support to the NISA.

Collection and Production Agencies

Present day intelligence agencies would cease to exist as we know them. The DNI would assign a specific intelligence discipline to a single subordinate organization. The organization's focus would be on collection and production of first phase intelligence for rapid insertion into databases. Databases would be available for pull by supported commands, analysts in the all-source production directorate and anyone else with access to INTELINK. This would ensure perishable information is forwarded, (pulled), early in the cycle without disrupting the

production of detailed reports. To enhance coordination of techniques and career development the senior military leader in each discipline would dual-hat as the chief of the Defense service (i.e. Defense HUMINT Service and Cryptologic Security Services).

National Intelligence Support Activity

The DNI would create a single activity to support the intelligence community. The NISA would: (1) combine all communications systems and activities, (2) consolidate logistics activities, (3) create a single personnel structure, (4) establish a common security investigation process and a single badging/verification system, and (5) centralize all training. Automation systems would be largely standardized with exceptions only when deemed absolutely necessary. This consolidation of intelligence community support functions would give the DNI the capability to create a single cost effective system optimized to meet standardization needs and customer support.

Summary

The winning of the cold war has left the intelligence community with a vastly different set of priorities and problems as it approaches the 21st Century. Because intelligence is key to development of national strategy as well as military execution of strategy, it must adapt to ensure it provides leaders with the timely information they need. Doing so in a period of budget reductions and exploding technology places unique challenges on the leadership of the intelligence community. A reshaped

intelligence community led by a Director of National Intelligence may be the answer. Central leadership could better focus resources on the customer's needs while combining redundant functions and capturing developing technology. The result would be a smaller, cheaper more effective intelligence community ready to meet the challenges of the future.

Notes

- David L. Boren, "Rethinking US Intelligence," <u>Defense</u> <u>Intelligence Journal 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 17.</u>
- 2. Ibid.
- 3. Scope of the Commission's Inquiry, Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, by Warren B. Rudman, Acting Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), 1.
- 4. Ibid., 8.
- 5. Ibid., 8.
- 6. Robert K. Ackerman, "Intelligence Community revamping Hinges on Targeting Decisions," Signal 49, no. 6(February 1994): 46.
- 7. John Deutch, "Toward a Better Intelligence Community Relationship," Defense Issues 10, no. 73 (June 1995): 2.
- 8. Ibid.
- 9. Ibid.
- 10. Gordon R. Sullivan, and James M. Dubik, <u>War in the Information Age</u>, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: <u>US Army War College</u>, Strategic Studies Institute, June 1994), 9.
- 11. Ibid., 7.
- 12. Ibid.
- 13. Peter Rackham, "Uniting the Tower of Babel," <u>Jane's Defence</u> Weekly 22, no. 16 (22 June 1994): 26.
- 14. Emmett Paige Jr., "From the Cold War to the Global Information Age," <u>Defense Issues</u> 10, no. 34 (February 1995): 1-4.
- 15. Deutch, 3.
- 16. Alfred Monteiro Jr., "Mustering the Force: Cryptologic Support to Military Operations," <u>Defense Intelligence Journal</u> 4, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 71.
- 17. Ibid., 74-76.

- 18. Robert K. Ackerman, "Intelligence Aim Veers to Amassing Overt Information," <u>Signal</u> 47, no. 12 (August 1993): 38.
- 19. Boren, 21.
- 20. Ackerman, "Intelligence Aim Veers," 37.
- 21. Paige, 1.
- 22. Ackerman, "Intelligence Aim Veers," 37.
- 23. Paige, 3.
- 24. "Commanders Pull Intelligence in Information Warfare Strategy," <u>Signal</u> 48, no. 12 (August 1994): 31.
- 25. Deutch, 2.
- 26. Scope of the Commission's Inquiry, 15-17.
- 27. Ibid., 16-17.
- 28. Boren, 20.
- 29. Boren, 18.

Selected Bibliography

- Ackerman, Robert K. "Intelligence Aim Veers To Amassing Overt Information." Signal 47, no. 12 (August 1993): 37-39.
- _____. "Intelligence Community Revamping Hinges on Targeting Decisions." Signal 49, no. 6 (February 1995): 45-48.
- Arquilla, John. "The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance." Strategic Review 22, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 24-30.
- Banford, Harry C. "Meteoric changes Forecast in Intelligence Processes." <u>Signal</u> 45, no. 11 (July 1991): 89-91.
- Boren, David L. "Rethinking US Intelligence." <u>Defense</u>
 <u>Intelligence Journal</u> 1, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 17-29.
- "Commanders Pull Intelligence in Information Warfare Strategy." Signal 48, no. 12 (August 1994): 29-31.
- Deutch, John. "Toward a Better Intelligence Community Relationship." <u>Defense Issues</u> 10, no. 73 (June 1995).
- "Defense Network Triggers New Technologies, Services." <u>Signal</u> 48, no. 9 (May 1994): 71-72.
- Fogleman, Ronald R. "Information Operations: The Fifth Dimension of Warfare." <u>Defense Issues</u> 10, no. 47 (April 1995).
- Hollister, Gregory S. <u>Multilevel Security: How it fits in the Strategic Vision "C4I For the Warrior"</u>. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, February 1993.
- Kahan, James P., D. Robert Worley and Cathleen Stasz.

 <u>Understanding Commanders' Information Needs</u>. Prepared for the United States Army. Report R-3761-A. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, June 1989.
- Monteiro, Alfred Jr. "Mustering the Force: Cryptologic Support to Military Operations." <u>Defense Intelligence Journal</u> 4, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 67-82.
- Paige, Emmett Jr. "From the Cold War to the Global Information Age." Defense Issues 10, no. 34 (February 1995).
- Powell, Colin L. "Information-Age Warriors." Byte 17, no. 7 (July 1992): 370.
- Rackham, Peter. "Uniting the Tower of Babel." <u>Jane's Defence</u> Weekly 22, no. 16 (22 October 1994): 26-28.

- Reaney, David W., William Melton, Debra Hobgood, Patricia O'Brien and Paul Jaeger. "Intelligence Community Reorganization."
 Fort Meade, MD.: National Security Agency, Director's Fellows Office, 1995. Photocopied.
- Sentinel, Carlisle, PA "Panel: Give more power to CIA Chief."
 March 1, 1996: A5.
- Scope of the Commissions Inquiry. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. By Warren B. Rudman, Acting Chairman. Washington, D.C.:
 Government Printing Office, June 6, 1995.
- Sullivan, Gordon R. and James M. Dubik. <u>War in the Information</u>

 <u>Age</u>. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic

 <u>Studies Institute</u>, June 1994.
- Swenson, Russell G. "The Elements of Intelligence Readiness."
 Defense Intelligence Journal 3, No. 1 (Spring 1994): 53-74.
- Toffler, Alvin and Heidi Toffler. War and Antiwar. New York: Warner Books Inc., 1993.
- Wickham, John A. Jr. "The Role of Intelligence in Desert Storm." Signal 45, no. 8 (April 1991): 12.